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CASE COMMENTS
TAXATION-JURISDICTION OF DOMICILIARY STATE TO TAX
TRANSFER OF PROPERTY LOCATED IN ANOTHER STATE.
Settlor, resident and domiciled in Oregon, owned various stocks
and securities which were managed for him by a trust company in
Illinois. At his direction, these securities were liquidated, and with
the proceeds the company purchased federal reserve notes which it held
as agent for the settlor. Settlor executed in Oregon a trust agreement
transferring to the company as trustee the federal reserve notes. The
trust was irrevocable, in favor of definite beneficiaries, and by its terms
the trustee was to purchase with the notes property, real or personal
at its discretion, for the trust account.
Pursuant to a statute,' Oregon attempted to tax the transfer of
the notes under the trust agreement, but the Supreme Court of that
state held that the notes were tangibles, and therefore, under the
Fourteenth Amendment, not taxable by Oregon because not within its
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the
judgment of the Oregon court, stating that since Oregon had jurisdiction to tax by virtue of the statute, the Fourteenth Amendment does
not take away that jurisdiction. The court treated the transfer under
the trust agreement as one indivisible transaction-a transfer of
intangibles in contemplation of death.
In a separate opinion, Justice Stone answered what he considered
to be the only federal question raised by saying that "nothing in the
Constitution prevents taxation by Oregon of a gift by its citizen of
federal reserve notes located elsewhere." Justice McReynolds dissented without opinion. Pearson v. McGraw, 60 S. Ct. 211 (1939).
Tangible personal property is subject to taxation by the state in
2
which it is permanently located. If such property has acquired a siits
in a state other than that in which the owner is domiciled, the latter
4
state may not tax it.' The situs concept, as regards jurisdiction to
' "All property within the jurisdiction of the state, . . . whether
tangible or intangible, which shall pass or vest . . . by deed, grant,
bargain, sale or gift, or as an advancement or division of his or her
estate made in contemplation of death of the grantor, . . . to any
person or persons, . . . in trust or otherwise, . . . shall be and is subject to tax at the rate hereinafter specified in section 10-603, to be
paid to the treasurer of the state for the use of the state; . . " Section
10-601, Oregon Code 1930.
' Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 299, 25 S. Ct.
686 (1905); Note (1939) 123 A.L.R. 179, 182.
3Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 26 S.
Ct. 36 (1905).
1 Cooley discusses situs as follows: "In order to acquire a situs in a
state or taxing district so as to be taxable in the state or district
regardless of the domicile of the owner and not taxable in another
state or district at the domicile of the owner, tangible personal
property must be more or less permenently located in the state or
district. In other words, the situs of tangible personal property is
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tax tangible property, is closely related to the benefit theory,8 and
makes the power to tax dependent upon some element of control.6
Taxation of tangible personal property, by a state which does not
have jurisdiction according to these criteria, amounts to a taking of
private property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Applying the benefit theory, the Supreme Court held in Frick v.
Pennsylvania8 that under the Fourteenth Amendment the privilege of
taxing the right of succession to the ownership of tangible personal
property can be exercised only by the state in which the property has
acquired a situs. In denying the right of the domiciliary state to
enforce an inheritance tax on tangible personalty located in another
state, the court said that the transfer of such property occurred under
the jurisdiction of the state of its situs, not under the jurisdiction and
laws of the state of decedent's domicilY It then reiterated the familiar
"principle" that a tax by the latter on such transfer would contravene
the due process clause.'
With regard to succession taxes on the transfer of intangibles,
the ancient maxim mobilia sequuntur personamr" furnished a conwhere it is more or less permanently located rather than ,where it
is merely in transit or temporarily and for no considerable time."
II Cooley, Taxation (4th ed. 1924) sec. 452.
r The benefit theory was first clearly expressed in Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 26 S. Ct. 36 (1905) in which
the Supreme Court denied the right of a state to tax a resident
corporation upon its rolling stock permanently used outside the state.
Briefly stated, if the state is in position to render to the owner some
benefit in connection with the object taxed, there is a reasonable basis
for jurisdiction to tax; if the state is not in such a position, it lacks
that jurisdiction. Merrill, Jurisdiction to Tax-Another Word (1935)
44 Yale L. J. 582, 585-86.
GBasing jurisdiction on control may be characterized as upsidedown logic. As one writer states it, "Control for tax purposes is predicated upon the assumption of jurisdiction to tax. It is the consequent, not the antecedent, of a judicial determination that jurisdiction to tax exists." Lowndes, Rate and Measure in Jurisdiction to Tax
(1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 756, 758.
7"If the taxing power be in no position to render these services,
or otherwise to benefit the person of property taxed, and such
property be wholly within the taxing power of another State, to
which it may be said to owe an allegiance and to which it looks for
protection, the taxation of such property within the domicile of the
owner partakes rather of the nature of an extortion than a tax,
and has been repeatedly held by this court to be beyond the power
of the legislature and a taking of property without due process of
law." Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194,
202, 26 S. Ct. 36 (1905).
-268 U. S. 473, 45 S. Ct. 603 (1925).
'Id. at 494.
"0Id. at 496.
n As expressed in II Cooley, Taxation (4th ed. 1924) sec. 440, "this
maxim is merely a fiction of law." He goes on to say that "So far
as applied to taxation, it merely means that the situs of personal
property for purposes of taxation is the domicile of the owner unless
(1) there is a statute to the contrary, or (2) the property is tangible
and has acquired all actual situs of its own in a state or place other
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venient device upon which to base the right of the state of domicl to
tax. That right has been consistently upheld." With the decision of
Blackstone v. Miller,"' the Supreme Court committed itself to the view
that any state which contributes in effecting the transfer of an intangible property right also may tax that transfer.
However, in Farmers Loan Co. v. Minnesota,"' Blackstone v. Miller
was expressly repudiated. The court stated that there existed no sufficient reason for saying that intangibles are not entitled to the same
immunity against double taxation as is accorded to tangible property."
This View was reiterated two years later in First National Bank v.
Maine," in which case the court refused to permit the state of incorporation to tax the transfer by succession of corporation stock owned
by a nonresident decedent. By emphasizing the question of jurisdiction as based on situs, the majority of the court found that such a
transfer "is an event single in character and is effected under the
laws, and occurs within the limits, of a particular state . . .",'I thus
precluding the possibility of a transfer tax by more than one state. In
a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Stone again voiced approval of the
benefit theory, 8 and stated:
"Situs of an intangible, for taxing purposes, as the decisions of
this Court, including the present one, abundantly demonstrate, is
not a dominating reality, but a convenient fiction which may be
judicially employed or discarded, according to the result desired.""
The view expressed in fhe dissent in First National Bank v. Maine
seems to prevail today. Situs as previously defined, does not ipso facto
determine that one state may and others may not tax the transfer
of intangibles; nor is it now held that the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits double taxation on death transfers thereof.2 Under the decisions of Curry v. McCanless2 and Graves v. Elliott, both the domicil
of the creator of a revocable trust of intangibles and the state in which
the trust is set up and the evidences of the intangibles kept may tax
than where the owner is domiciled, or (3), in case of intangible
property, it has acquired a business situs in a state other than the
one where the owner is domiciled."
2 Merrill, supra note 5, at 589.
188 U. S. 189, 23 S. Ct. 277 (1903) (upheld New York tax on the
transfer of local bank deposits by non-resident testator).
" 280 U. S. 204, 50 S. Ct. 98 (1930).
Id. at 212.
16284 U. S. 312, 52 S. Ct. 174 (1932).
7Id. at 327.
28"... control and benefit are together the ultimate and indubitable justification of all taxation." Id. at 334.
"Id. at 332.
"Though concurring in the result of the Farmers Loan Co. case,
Mr. Justice Stone expressed in a separate opinion his disapproval of
invoking the due process clause to prohibit multiple taxation in
every case.
'307 U. S. 357, 59 S. Ct. 900 (1939)2307 U. S. 383, S. Ct. (1939).
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the transaction arising at his death. It matters not that the power
of revocation Is never exercised.
A seemingly perfect foundation for the holding of the Oregon
courts was laid by the Supreme Court in Blodgett v. Silberman.' In
tbat case Connecticut was denied the right to impose a succession and
transfer tax on property in New York left by a resident testator. With
regard to certain money and bank notes kept by the testator in a safe
deposit box in a New York bank the court said:
"But we think that the money, so definitely fixed and separated
in its actual situs from the person of the owner as this was, is
tangible property and can not be distinguished from the paintings
and furniture held in the Frick case to be taxable only in the
jurisdiction where they were.'"
Relying on Blodgett v. Silberman, the Oregon court regarded the
Hayes trust agreement as transferring tangible property which had
never acquired a situs at the domicil of the settlor.
The majority of the court in the instant case was able to see a
transfer of intangibles in the trust instrument prepardd by the Oregon
resident, and as a consequence it decided the controversy on the
authority of Curry v. Mcfanless. By refusing "to make a fetish of
form" it saw "but one integrated and indivisible transaction-a transfer by decedent of intangibles in contemplation of death."2
In view of the fact that the trust agreement transferred federal
reserve notes and directed the trustee to invest them "in whatever
form of property real or personal . . . (it) . . . shall deem proper and
for the best interests of the trust estate",2 it is difficult to understand just wherein the court saw a transfer of intangibles. The
majority opinion does not refute the finding by the Oregon court that
federal reserve notes are tangible property. If the notes are considered tangibles, the conclusion of the latter court seems inescapable
under the rule of Frick v. Pennsylvania. The trust agreement transferred bank notes, not property which had been exchanged for the
notes. And, as stated by the Oregon court, the fact that the transaction may have been planned for the purpose of evading the tax
cannot affect the result if it was lawful.3
It is interesting to speculate on the effect of the opinion of Mr.
Justice Stone, had it been adopted by the majority. Despite the fact
that, as he stated, the question is whether a state may constitutionally
tax a gift of banknotes permanently located without the state, there
appear to be only three alternatives in deciding that question as he
decides it. Either 1) federal reserve notes are intangibles and the
quasi-obiter in Blodgett v. Silberman is not applicable, or 2) federal
In re Hayes' Estate, Ore., 86 P. (2d) 424 (1939). The decision
was reversed in the instant case.
"277 U. S. 1, 48 S. Ct. 410 (1928).
zId. at 18.
Instant case at 213.
17 In
re Hayes's Estate-Ore,--86 P. (2d) 424, 426 (1939).
Id. at 432-33.
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reserve notes are tangibles and Prick v. Pennsylvania is overruled,1
or 3) the transfer of property by gift in contemplation of death is
governed by rules which differ from those governing transfer by
succession, even though that succession takes place under a will."
The choice of any of these alternatives might give rise to embarrassing
questions.
M.Avmx M. TiNOHEn
CRIMINAL LAW-THE FELONY MURDER DOCTRINE IN
KENTUCKY*
The appellant willfully set fire to a dwelling at night, and as a
result an occupant was burned to death. Appellant was convicted of
murder on the ground that the death was the natural consequence
of the arson. He sought a new trial, alleging that the lower court
erred in refusing to submit to the jury the question of whether the
death of the occupant was a necessary or natural consequence of the
burning of the dwelling. In affirming the conviction the court said,
"There can be no doubt that the death of this child was the natural
consequence of burning the house; therefore, it was not necessary...
to submit this question for the determination of the jury." Whitfield v. Commonwealth, 278 Ky. 111, 128 S. W. (2d) 208 (1939).
In the case at bar the court seems to be in accord with its prior
holding in Red-dick v. Commonwealth,' but the case clarifies and explains the Kentucky Court's attitude toward the felony murder doctrine. Prior to the instant case, the Kentucky Court had held that
where a death ensues during the commission of a felony dangerous
to life, the felon was guilty of murder.2 The rule was not qualified
in any manner, and the popular conception has been that the felony
did not have to be the proximate cause of the death. But in the
case uder discussion, the court did consider proximate cause and
"Mr. Justice Stone cleverly avoids committing himself on this
point when he says (at 214), "there is nothing in the Constitution to
compel a state to treat federal reserve notes for tax purposes as
chattels were treated in Frick v. Pennsylvania . . ." It is unlikely,
however, that he would say that there is nothing in the Constitution
to compel a state to treat chattels as chattels were treated in Frick v.
Pennsylvania. He did not dissent in that case.
'Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. 'S. 473, 45 S. Ct. 603 (1925);
Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1, 48 S. Ct. 410 (1928).
* This comment is written in conjunction with the one immediately
following. The same case is considered in both. The writers reach
different conclusions.
117 Ky. Law Rep. 1020, 33 S. W. 416 (1895). The defendant set
fire to a hotel under cover of night and an occupant was burned to
death. The question of proximate cause was not presented on appeal,
but the court held that when one commits a dangerous felony and a
death ensues the felon is guilty of murder.
2Reddick v. Commonwealth, 17 Ky. Law Rep. 1020, 33 S.W.
416 (1895); Williams v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 830, 81 S.W. (2d)
891 (1935); Marion v. Commonwealth, 269 Ky. 729, 108 S.W. (2nd)
721 (1937).

